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The Transnational Law Market, Regulatory
Competition, and Transnational Corporations
HORST EIDENMJLLER*
ABSTRACT
In many regions of the world and across various fields, law has
become a product. Individuals and companies seek attractive legal
regulations, and countries advertise their legal wares globally as they
compete for customers. Transnational corporations in particular are
prominent actors in the emerging transnational law market. This article
investigates the causes of this development and discusses these changes
with respect to company law, contract law, the law of dispute resolution,
and insolvency law. It assesses the market for legal rules and its
practical consequences, and it provides legal policy recommendations for
an efficient framework of the transnational law market. The emphasis is
on transnational corporations as market actors and on specifics of the
European regulatory framework.
I. COMPETITION FOR LAW AS A PRODUCT
Competition in markets for goods and services is a central feature of
market economy systems. The market decides which products and
services are offered and at what prices. The boundaries of the market
depend on society's decision as to what constitute tradable goods. On its
face, law does not appear to belong in this category. We perceive law to
be a framework within which trade takes place. We do not, however,
consider law itself to be a product.
Nevertheless, law has become a commodity in many parts of the
world and in relation to many different topics. Individuals and
* This article is a revised version of a paper that I presented at the
"Transnationalism in Law, the State, and Society" Conference held from March 3-5, 2010,
in Bremen. Professor, Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, Germany, and Oxford
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companies seek attractive legal regulations, and countries compete for
customers of their legal wares. For example, an Italian entrepreneur
residing in Bremen could set up an English limited company for her
business, finance the enterprise with bonds and loans under New York
law, choose arbitration in Switzerland for all disputes that arise, and,
should she find herself ruined by her creditor's claims, file for private
bankruptcy in France. All of this may be organized from a villa in
Bremen with the aim of gaining maximum financial and strategic
advantage.
Jurisdictions advertise their legal products and react sensitively to
changes in demand. If the statutes of a country do well in business, the
tax-paying legal services industry does well too. For this reason, the
English Law Society has published a brochure entitled "England and
Wales: the jurisdiction of choice."' The alleged advantages of English
law are described in glowing terms. In his foreword, then-English
Secretary of State for Justice Jack Straw writes, "This brochure sets out
the reasons for our success and lets people know why it is in their own
interests to use English law and to settle their disputes here."2 The
professional representatives of legal professionals in Germany could not
let this go unanswered. They countered with the brochure "Law made in
Germany."3 In her foreword, then-Minister of Justice Brigitte Zypries
says, "Law made in Germany is a guarantee for success."4 The character
of law as a commodity can hardly be expressed more clearly.
This article analyzes important aspects of the law market. It is a
market for legal rules, not a market for investments.5 This article
initially investigates the reasons for the emergence of the law market
and continues to illustrate this market with findings in the fields of
company law, contract law, the law of dispute resolution, and insolvency
law. It highlights the role of transnational corporations as important
market actors. Particularly, the normative analysis of the law market
and its consequences are of great importance. Based on considerations
of economic efficiency, this article develops policy recommendations for
the structure of the European legal framework.
1. THE LAw Soc'Y OF ENG. & WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF
CHOICE, available at http://www.1awsociety.org.uk/documents/downloads/jurisdiction
of_choice brochure.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
2. Id. at 5.
3. BuNDESMINISTERIN DER JUSTIZ, LAW - MADE IN GERMANY, http://www.bmj.bund.
de/files/-/3426/Broschuere-Rechtsexport.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). See also Volker
Triebel, Der Kampf ums anwendbare Recht, 5 ANWALTSBIATT 305, 305-08 (2008)
(discussing the beginnings of this debate).
4. Id.
5. As to competition for investments, see generally Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition
for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725 (2005).
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This article's focus on the aforementioned fields of law does not
mean that the law market is restricted to these areas. Similar
developments can also be observed in the law of property and family
law.6 However, for the purposes of illustration and identification of the
decisive structural issues and problems of "law as a product,"
concentration on the areas selected here is sufficient. The same applies
with regard to the focal treatment of the European law market. There
is, of course, a similar market in other regions as well, particularly in
and between the United States of America. Although this article makes
comparisons with the law market in the United States, the focus here is
the European perspective, especially considering that the framework
conditions for the law market differ significantly between the United
States and Europe.
On its face, the issue of "law as a product" is relatively profane in
character. However, this article shows that the subject raises significant
philosophical questions, particularly in regard to legal policy
conclusions that may be drawn from assessing the emerging market for
law. These philosophical issues cannot be exhaustively discussed here.
However, an answer will be given to the question of which conceptual
course-setting elements are decisive for recommending or not
recommending certain framework conditions for the law market.
Part II discusses the emergence of the transnational law market,
while part III discusses some of its more important segments. Part IV
analyzes characteristics and effects of the law market, while part V
examines the special role of transnational corporations as market
actors. Part VI presents a normative assessment of the law market, and
part VII develops some policy recommendations with respect to the
European governance framework. Concluding remarks follow in part
VIII.
II. EMERGENCE OF A TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET
Market activity only arises if there is supply and demand for a
particular product or service. The fact that law has become a product
across broad subjects and regions is linked to structural changes on the
supply-and-demand side of law as a commodity.
A. Demand Side
On the demand side, the ability to choose which law shall apply (i.e.,
conflict of laws options) in global transactions has made the law market
6. See ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 161-81, 183-98 (2009).
709
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
possible. In addition, technological changes have occurred, which make
an informed choice significantly easier.
1. Expanded Opportunities for Choice of Law
Anyone dissatisfied with the legal rules of a certain jurisdiction can
leave the country, at least in cases that do not involve a dictatorial
regime, and find comfort in a state that has more preferable laws. In
doing so, one escapes the regulatory dictates of the country in which she
previously lived. Historically, physical exit was often the only possibility
of expressing dissatisfaction.7 In some respects, this is still the case
today. Anyone seeking to legally escape taxation by a country must, in
most cases, actually move his place of residence or his business
activities out of that country. The situation is similar in another sphere
of life, namely marriage, where temporary departure from one's own
jurisdiction is normally necessary in order to make use of more liberal
marriage provisions (i.e., "wedding tourism").
Fundamental change has now resulted from the fact that free choice
of law is on the advance with regard to numerous issues in the private
international law of many countries.8 This applies to the same extent
both in Europe and the United States, but less so in many Latin
American jurisdictions.9 Certainly, this development was and is not
driven by a desire to make law a product. Choosing freely in private
international law is, instead, regarded as an instrument to increase
legal certainty with respect to the applicable law and, at the same time,
to strengthen private autonomy.' 0 With these expanded opportunities
7. For a fundamental discussion of various control mechanisms in relation to the
performance of private and public institutions, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
8. For overviews, see O'HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 6, at 37-84 (citing chapters
describing choice-of-law principles and the creation of a "law market"); Giesela Riuhl, Party
Autonomy in the Private International Law of Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and
Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALISED WORLD 153, 155-75 (Eckart
Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007). One reason for this development is certainly that physical
exit has become easier and cheaper. This enables individuals and companies to exert
pressure regarding the recognition of a conflict of laws choice of law. For a comparative
analysis of the "federal conflicts law" in the U.S. and Europe, see Jurgen Basedow, Federal
Choice of Law in Europe and the United States - A Comparative Account of Interstate
Conflicts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2119-46 (2008).
9. See, e.g., Jilrgen Basedow, The Recent Development of the Conflict of Laws: Some
Comparative Observations, in JAPANESE AND EUROPEAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3, 14 (Jiirgen Basedow et al. eds., 2008) (including further
references).
10. See JAN KROPHOLLER, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT §§ 21(11), 40(111) (6th ed.
2006) (Ger.); Friedrich K Juenger, Parteiautonomie und objektive Ankniupfung im EG-
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for choice of law, however, come increasing opportunities to choose
foreign law without having to physically leave the home country, which
means considerably lower costs. In principle, escape from mandatory
provisions under national law is also possible. Finally, market actors
can combine the regulations of different countries with one another, as
seen by our Italian entrepreneur in the initial example. It is possible to
choose from the different laws offered in various countries based upon
what is most favorable for one's own interests in the relevant sphere of
life-thus, laws can be "unbundled.""
Expanded opportunities for choice of law do not only exist at the
level of conflict of laws. The potential subject matters of such conflict of
laws choices have also increased considerably in the recent past. This
applies in particular to Europe, where the European Union has enriched
the law products of the individual EU Member States. In European
company law, there is, for instance, the European Public Company
(Societas Europaea or SE), which may well be joined in the near future
by a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea or SPE).12
Hence, expanded opportunities for choice exist because of changes in
private international law and due to altered substantive law products.
Taken together, these developments provide for increased opportunities
for legal arbitrage and, thus, enable competition for legal rules-law can
be selected and deselected by market actors.' 3
These considerations demonstrate also that the market for law
products does not and cannot exist without a foundation of legal rules.
On the contrary, the law market is instead a function of the applicable
law that grants the choice of law opportunities, both in conflict of laws
and in substantive law. A change in the conditions of the applicable
legal framework automatically facilitates a change in the structure of
the law market. I will return to this point later.
2. Increased Ease in Choice of Law
In addition to the expanded choice of law opportunities on the
demand side, it is most notably the increased ease in choice of law that
Ubereinkommen zum Internationalen Vertragsrecht, 46 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSIANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 57, 63-68 (1982) (Ger.).
11. See, e.g., Peter Behrens, Economic Law Between Harmonization and Competition:
The Law & Economics Approach, in ECONOMIc LAW AS AN ECONOMIC GOOD 45, 54-55
(Karl Meessen et al. eds., 2009).
12. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL
REGULATION ON THE STATUTE FOR A EUROPEAN PRIVATE COMPANY (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/company/docs/epc/proposal en.pdf.
13. See Hein Kdtz, Deutsches Recht und Common Law im Wettbewerb, ANWALTSBLA'T
[ANWBL] 1, 7 (2010) (Ger.).
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has contributed to the emergence of the law market and continues to do
so. Technical progress, particularly the Internet, has lowered
information and transaction costs considerably, thereby creating the
possibility of choosing the best law for individual purposes swiftly and
efficiently. Information and transaction intermediaries also contribute
to the choice of law by providing professional assistance. For example,
anyone wishing to form a foreign company or file for bankruptcy abroad
can make use of numerous service providers. Thus, informed choice has
become much easier and more accessible. Concerning company law, the
English limited company is being intensely promoted, particularly in
response to German demand, and professional support is being offered
for foreigners who wish to form an English limited company.14 With
respect to insolvency law for individuals, France in particular has
become the target for such agents as the "jurisdiction of choice" and is
apparently highly attractive to German clientele.' 5
B. Supply Side
The emergence of a transnational market for legal products is not
only based on fundamental changes on the demand side. The existence
of any market also presupposes suppliers who compete with each other.
In the case of legal products, this means that there must be incentives
for the participating jurisdictions to market their wares.
With respect to competition for investments, the incentives are
obvious. If firms locate investments in their territory, countries profit in
terms of higher taxes, employment, and contribution to their GDP.
However, there are similar incentives with respect to the competition
for legal rules. In the United States, for example, the existence of a
market for company law is all but a recent development.16 It is the small
East Coast state of Delaware that by far plays the leading role.
Approximately sixty percent of the 500 largest U.S. companies are
incorporated in Delaware and are therefore subject to its company law.' 7
The state of Delaware has massive incentives to facilitate such
14. See, e.g., GO AHEAD: DIE GRONDER, http://www.go-limited.de (last visited Feb. 23,
2011).
15. See VERBRAUCHERINSOLVENZ, http://www.sda-europe.de (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
16. As to the historical emergence of a market for company law, accounting for the U.S.
and the European Union level, see Richard M. Buxbaum, Is There a Place for a European
Delaware in the Corporate Conflict of Laws?, 74 RABEL J. COMP. & INT'L PRIVATE L.1, 9-13
(2010).
17. See Matt Stevens, Internal Affairs Doctrine: California versus Delaware in a Fight
for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1047, 1049 (2007); see also
About Agency, DEPARTMENT OF STATE: DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
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incorporations. It obtains more than twenty percent of its entire annual
tax revenue from incorporation and franchise fees.18 By contrast, EU
Member States cannot charge such taxes or fees on the basis of the
applicable legal conditions.'9 Therefore, they lack the direct financial
incentives to market their laws the way Delaware does. This likewise
applies to the other areas of the law discussed here.
However, indirect financial incentives are presumably far more
important than direct financial incentives. If the law of a country is
used in various territories worldwide, then it means that the country's
specialized service providers (e.g., lawyers, tax advisors, and
accountants) also do well. 20 They, of course, contribute to the country's
GDP and also pay taxes. Former English Secretary of State for Justice
Jack Straw is very aware of this. In his foreword to the above-cited
brochure published by the Law Society he writes, "the success of the
legal services sector plays an unquantifiable role in helping London to
maintain its position as a major centre for global commerce." 21 In
addition, the export of a country's own law also makes it easier for that
country's real economy to succeed in foreign markets. If the legal
infrastructure in a foreign environment is familiar, establishment in
this environment is easier. The difficulty in quantifying this advantage
does not change the fact that it exists and presumably carries
considerable weight. There is no other way to explain the enormous
efforts made by individual countries to export their laws.22
C. The Transnational Law Market as a Recent Phenomenon
Competition for investments has existed for a long time. Choice of
law opportunities, particularly in the private international law regimes
of many countries, have as well, albeit to a lesser extent. The
18. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, GOVERNOR'S FISCAL YEAR 2010 RECOMMENDED
BUDGET 5, available at http://budget.delaware.gov/fy2Ol0/operating/l0opfinsumcharts.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
19. See Council Directive 69/335, arts. 2(1), 10, 12, 1969 O.J. (L 249) 25 (EC)
(concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital).
20. These advantages are underestimated by EVA-MARIA KIENINGER, WETTBEWERB
DER PRIVATRECHTSORDNUNGEN IM EUROPMSCHEN BINNENMARKT 190 (2002) (Ger.).
Naturally, not only the advisory sector in the home country profits, but also the advisory
sector on the home country law in a foreign country. However, the advantages for the
first-mentioned group probably predominate (to a large extent).
21. THE LAw Soc'Y OF ENG. & WALES, supra note 1, at 5.
22. For example, the (German) Gesellschaft ffir Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
GmbH, whose sole shareholder is the Federal Republic of Germany, spent over EUR 1
billion on corresponding development projects in 2010. Uber die GIZ, GIZ,
http://www.giz.de/de/profil.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
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transnational law market developed as a result of the considerable
increase of choice of law opportunities on the demand side, and the
marketing of substantive law (i.e., the law products) by individual
countries on the supply side. It can no longer be disputed that such a
law market exists today in numerous regions and in many substantive
fields of the law.
As already touched upon, the title of the German Ministry of Justice
brochure, "Law made in Germany," alone speaks volumes. In addition,
various institutions assess the quality of the law in different
jurisdictions today (e.g., in the form of ranking lists, such as the "Global
Competitiveness Report" of the World Economic Forum). 23 The World
Bank's "Doing Business Reports" even more clearly demonstrate this
phenomenon of global regulatory competition. 24 In these reports,
countries are judged according to how well their law fulfills certain
functional requirements. For example, the ranking regarding the ease of
formation of a company places Germany at number 102 (United States:
6, United Kingdom: 8, and France: 14). It is apparently very difficult to
form a company in Germany. Moreover, the ranking list for the ease of
transfer of real estate shows France at number 166 (United States: 12,
United Kingdom: 22, and Germany: 52), indicating that it is very
difficult (i.e., requiring significant effort with respect to time and costs)
to acquire or to mortgage real estate in France. While the underlying
methodology of these ranking lists must be criticized,25 it does nothing
to alter the lists' influence on development policy and important loan-
making decisions. It also does not change the conspicuous fact that they
reveal to what extent countries compete with each other for the "best
law." Finally, and in the meantime, regulatory competition is further
evidenced by the fact that an alignment process related to legal concepts
23. KLAus SCHWAB & MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVE REPORT 2008-
2009, WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM 3-4 (2008), available at http://www.weforum.org/
pdf/GCR08/GCRO8.pdf.
24. World Bank, Economy Rankings, DOING BUs., http://www.doingbusiness.org/
rankings (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
25. See WORLD BANK INDEPENDENT EVALUATION GROUP, DOING BUSINESS: AN
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION - TAKING THE MEASURE OF THE WORLD BANK-IFC DOING
BUSINESS INDICATORS (2008) (evaluating the burden of selected business regulations in
178 countries). Cf. Priya Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric
Approach, 7 J. CORP. LEGAL STUD. 17-50 (2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
897479 (criticizing the underlying methodology of the World Bank Business Reports);
Mathias M. Siems, Statistische Rechtsvergleichung, 72 RABELS ZEITSCHRIP' FOR
AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABELSZ] 354, 368-78 (2008);
Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.'s Anti-
Director Rights Index' under Consistent Coding (Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center
Discussion Paper No. 7 ECGI - Law, Working Paper No. 67, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=894301.
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and ideas has started, reflecting the transnational popularity of certain
legal products. 26
The law market as a phenomenon differs from other related
phenomena. First, regulatory competition as it relates to legal products
is something different from systems competition.27 The former concerns
the choice of specific legal rules, not the choice of a system in the
broader sense, which includes not only legal rules, but also the
infrastructure of a particular country, its education system, and its
many other functions. Secondly, the law market is a market for the legal
rules of a country. Therefore, it does not involve the establishment of a
private-in the sense of nonstate-legal order or a private legal
framework by a corresponding act of the participating parties. 28 Finally,
the law market is a legal market. This distinguishes it from bribery or
corruption, where legal regulations may be enacted or prepared as
consideration for illegal payments. A further differentiation can also be
seen with respect to the fact that the law market is a market for
generally applicable legal provisions, that is to say rules which do not
only apply in special, individual cases. In this respect, the law market
differs from, for example, a settlement in civil proceedings or a so-called
"plea deal" in criminal proceedings, which merely concern the
application of an existing legal provision to specific conduct in an
individual case.
III. SEGMENTS OF THE LAW MARKET
The phenomenon of the law market is illustrated below by some of
its segments, namely company law, contract law, the law of dispute
resolution, and insolvency law. In at least some cases, there are
respective empirical studies regarding these segments that go beyond
merely showing which jurisdictions are the market leaders. These
studies also indicate why certain rules or regulations have been
successful in the transnational competition and others not. These
26. See infra Part III (discussing empirical studies that show which jurisdictions are
legal market leaders and why certain regulations have been successful in transnational
competition).
27. On systems competition see Karl M. Meessen, Prinzip Wettbewerb,
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 697, 703-06 (2009) (Ger.); Hans-Werner Sinn, The New Systems
Competition (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 623,
2001), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract-296233. See also Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (discussing an economic model
for the efficient allocation of public resources that relies on regulatory competition and the
mobility of consumer-voters).
28. See Peter Rawert & Markus Baumanns, Auf nach Transsystemien, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [FAZ] (Frankfurt), Mar. 4, 2009, at N5.
715
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 18:2
findings are important for the economic assessment of the law market in
part VI.
A. Company Law
As already mentioned, U.S. company law is dominated by Delaware.
The decisive reasons for this have yet to be completely explained. 29 In
particular, it remains unanswered whether Delaware's law is attractive
because it is more efficient than that of other states, or whether other
factors like preferential treatment for the management, network effects,
and path dependence play a more important role. Delaware's dominant
position relates not only to large corporations, but also to limited
liability companies. Limited liability companies are partnerships, which
are treated as such for tax purposes, but offer their partners limited
liability. A recent survey has shown Delaware as the leader in this
respect as well. 30
In Europe, regulatory competition in company law did not play a
significant role for a long time due to the real seat principle in the
conflict of laws of many different Member States. The real seat principle
states that the law applicable to a company is the law of the state in
which the company has its real seat (i.e., where its central place of
administration is located). This changed fundamentally with three
major decisions from the European Court of Justice: Centros,
Uberseering, and Inspire Art,31 which all concerned the freedom of
establishment. 32 These decisions resulted in Member States having to
recognize a company formed in another Member State according to its
law of formation, even if the company has never operated in the country
of formation. This effectively established the possibility of choice for
founders of the applicable company law. Given that the differences
between the company law systems of European Member States are
significantly greater than those in the United States, frequent use of
this choice of law could be expected.
29. See infra Part VI.B.1.b.
30. See Jens Dammann & Matthias Schiindeln, Where Are Limited Liability
Companies Formed? An Empirical Analysis 5 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 126, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126257 (noting that
around 50% of the LLCs with more than 1,000 employees are formed outside their home
state and of these, in turn, more than 80% in Delaware).
31. Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire
Art Ltd., 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155; Case C-208/00, UJberseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co.
Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9919; Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og
Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459.
32. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union arts.
49, 54, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 67, 69.
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1. Closed Corporations
This is precisely what happened, primarily and initially for closed
corporations (i.e., on the market for start-up entrepreneurs). The
English private company limited by shares (Ltd.), in particular, proved
to be very popular in the German market for the formation of
companies. It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of "German"
Ltds., as the obligatory requirement to register a branch or trade in the
country of operation is not fulfilled by all entrepreneurs. More accurate
results in this context could be obtained by looking at the places of
residence of the business managers. A residence exclusively in Germany
is a strong indication of a "German" Ltd. On this basis, almost every
fifth newly formed, closed corporation in Germany in 2005 was an
English Ltd., instead of a German limited liability company (GmbH). In
2006, at the height of the Ltd. boom, almost every fourth newly formed
closed corporation in Germany was an Ltd.33 At the end of 2006,
approximately 40,000 "German" Ltds. existed in Germany. Simple
econometric analyses revealed what made the Ltd. so popular: the lack
of a minimum capital requirement and the speed of incorporation.34
Some, therefore, consider that this development has been less a
competition for the best law, but rather a market for cheap company
formation.35 The Ltd. has been a popular legal form predominantly in
Member States where the costs of establishing a branch are
comparatively low (incorporation agents play an important part here as
well).36 Interestingly, the competition can only be partially interpreted
as crowding out competition. The total number of closed corporations
formed by Germans increased respectively in 2003, 2004, 2005, and
2006. Obviously, the Ltd. appealed to a clientele of founders who would
not have formed a closed corporation without the possibility of using
this legal form.
33. Horst EidenmUller, Die GmbH im Wettbewerb der Rechtsformen, 36 ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 168, 172-74 (2007) (Ger.). For
more details and statistics on the popularity of the English Ltd. among German
entrepreneurs, see Marco Becht et al., Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the
Cost of Entry, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 241, 241 (2008).
34. See Becht et al., supra note 33, at 250-52.
35. See William W. Bratton et. al., How Does Corporate Mobility Affect Lawmaking? A
Comparative Analysis, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 347, 374-80 (2009). By contrast, as here
(regulatory competition), Daniel Zimmer, Zwischen Theorie und Empirie: Zur Konkurrenz
der Gesetzgeber im Gesellschaftsrecht, in FESTSCHRII' FUR KARSTEN SCHMIDT ZUM, 70
GEBURTSTAG 1789, 1796-1800 (Georg Bitter et al. eds., 2009) (Ger.).
36. See Marco Becht et al., Centros and the Cost of Branching, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD.171,
181-83 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433311.
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The popularity of the Ltd. had a historic precursor. More than one
hundred years ago, its popularity served as a reason for the creation of
the GmbH Act and the first-time establishment of a closed corporation
entity in Germany.37 One hundred years later, the phenomenon
appeared again, this time for other reasons and with greater force, and
it did not take long for the EU Member States to react. The Sociedad
Limitada Nueva Empresa was launched in Spain in 2003, which allowed
a company to be formed with a minimum capital of C3,012 and within
only twenty-four hours.38 In 2003 and 2004, France fundamentally
reformed the law of the Socidtd & responsabilit6 limitge and abolished
the minimum capital requirement.39 Finally, Germany followed with the
GmbH reform in 2008, which led to the establishment of a new type of
company, the Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschrankt), a limited
liability company entity for entrepreneurs. In essence, this corporate
form is a GmbH without a minimum capital requirement. At first
glance, one might assume that the somewhat clumsy title given this
type of entity would put people or would-be businesses off. However, the
number of formations indicates that the Unternehmergesellschaft is a
huge success.40 As a result, the Ltd. has already lost part of its market
share in the German start-up market.
2. Public Corporations
A European law market for corporations also exists for public
corporations. As with closed corporations, English law is obviously
extremely attractive for large public corporations. For example, the
German airline Air Berlin operates in the legal form of a public limited
company by shares. However, the European Societas Europaea (SE) also
enjoys a certain popularity, precisely and particularly in Germany.
Large German corporations such as Allianz, Porsche, BASF, Fresenius,
37. See Holger Fleischer, Introduction to 1 MIONCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ
BETREFFEND DIE GESELLScHAFFEN MIT BESCHRANKTER HAFTUNG - GMBHG, 1 56 (Holger
Fleischer & Wulf Goette eds., 2010) (Ger.) (author's translation).
38. Ley 7/2003 arts. 134(6)-(10), 135(1) (B.O.E. 2003, 79) (Spain). See Jos6 Miguel
Embid Irujo, Eine spanische ,,Erfindung" im Gesellschaftsrecht: Die ,,Sociedad limitada
nueva empresa" - die neue unternehmerische GmbH, 50 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN
WIRTSCHAFr [RIW] 760, 760-67 (2004) (Ger.).
39. Loi 2003-721 pour l'initiative 6conomique of August 4, 2003 (Fr.). See Horst
Eidenmiller et al., Minimum Capital within the System of Legal Capital, in 1 EUR. Co. &
FIN. L. REV. [E.C.F.R.] 17, 37 & n.72 (Marcus Lutter ed., 2006).
40. See, e.g., Wilhelm Niemeier, Erste Startkapitalisierungsdaten der 'VG"- Mit
Schwung in die kapitallose Unternehmensgraindung?, DER BETRIEB STATUS RECHT [DB]
74, 74 (2009) (Ger.) (reporting 4,820 UG-registrations in the first four months of the
existence of the new legal form).
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and MAN have decided in favor of this legal form. In fact, 70 of the total
213 SEs in existence in June 2008 (i.e., approximately one-third) were
located in Germany.41
Regression analyses show the factors that are responsible for the
popularity of the SE in Germany.42 Primarily, founders are concerned
with avoiding codetermination on the (supervisory) board level if
possible, or at least mitigating its effects. For example, if thresholds for
employee figures of 500 or 2000 are likely to be exceeded, an SE may be
formed to "freeze" the existing level of codetermination. 43 However, even
in cases where a company already has more than 2000 employees, an
SE can be used as a vehicle to mitigate the effects of codetermination by
equal representation on the supervisory board. Although the relevant
European and Member States' rules provide that the most rigid
codetermination provisions prevail if the relevant parties fail to reach a
mutual agreement on workers' representation in an SE,44 the capital
side can unilaterally reduce the size of the supervisory board in an SE.45
Moreover, in an SE, such a board-in contrast to, for example, a
German national stock corporation-has a mandatory international
composition. From the point of view of the investors, this is obviously an
advantage: divide et impera.
B. Contract Law
In the United States, the contract law market is dominated not by
the law of Delaware, but by the law of New York. According to a recent
study of important business law contracts, New York law is chosen for
41. See Horst Eidenmilller et al., Die Societas Europaea: Empirische
Bestandsaufnahme und Entwicklungslinien einer neuen Rechtsform, DIE
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT [AG] 721, 725 (2008) (Ger.).
42. See Horst Eidenmuiller et al., Incorporating Under European Law: The Societas
Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EuR. Bus. ORG. L. REv. [E.B.O.R.] 1, 31-33
(2009).
43. Under German law, in a public corporation with more than 500 employees, one-
third of all members of the supervisory board must be worker representatives. In a public
corporation with more than 2,000 employees, the quota is one-half.
44. See Art. 7 in conjunction with the standard rules in Part 3 of the Annex of Council
Directive 2001/86/EC of October 8, 2001, supplementing the Statute for a European
Company with regard to the involvement of employees Council Directive 2001/86, art. 7,
Annex Part 3, O.J. (L 294) 3 at 22 (EC); SE-Beteiligungsgesetz [SEBG][Act on the
Employee Involvement in an SE], Dec. 22, 2004, BGBL. I at 3675, 3686 §§ 34-38 (Ger.). To
date and to my knowledge, there are no cases in which negotiations have failed.
45. Pursuant to Section SE-Beteiligungsgesetz [SEBG] § 17(1), the minimum number
of members of a supervisory board is three; § 35(2) ensures that the employees are
represented, but does not give rise to a claim to retain the original number of employees'
representatives.
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commercial contracts in 46% of all cases in which a choice of law
provision is included in the agreement.46 By contrast, the law of
Delaware is chosen in only fifteen percent of all such cases. Where a
choice of law provision in a contract provides that New York law shall
apply to any disputes arising under the agreement, it is also common to
find a clause naming New York as the jurisdiction in which disputes
should be settled. Regression analyses show that the popularity of New
York law cannot be explained merely by the place of business of the
parties, their place of incorporation, or the location of the advising
lawyers. 47 Apparently, the efficiency of court proceedings in New York
plays a role, along with the subjectively perceived sensitivity of New
York law to the interests of financial institutions. This is a remarkable
finding to which I will return later. Above all, the lawyers who are
located and provide advice in New York benefit from the popularity of
New York law. For them, the choice of law brings additional business.
In Europe too, jurisdictions that have the reputation of being
sensitive to the needs of commerce and businesses are often the
jurisdictions selected as governing law in business agreements. For
example, a representative survey by the University of Oxford of 100
European companies with cross-border activity (a majority (19%) of the
companies involved in the study were German) showed that English law
was the most popular and was selected by 23% of the firms. Swiss law
was the second most popular choice and was selected by 19% of the
firms.48 If the choice is made excluding the home jurisdiction of one of
the contractual partners, Swiss law prevails in 29% of the cases.
Eurobonds of internationally operating European companies are usually
subjected to English law.49
In the Oxford study cited above, the participating companies
vaguely indicated that a primary reason for the popularity of English or
Swiss law is the quality of their contract law. From a German point of
view, this can be stated more specifically: parties to a contract wish to
avoid the perceived inappropriateness of judicial review of
preformulated, standard contract terms with respect to principles of
46. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies'
Contracts, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2009).
47. See id.
48. Civil Justice Systems in Europe: Implications for Choice of Forum and Choice of
Contract Law; A Business Survey-Final Results, INST. EUR. & COMP. L.: U. OXFORD FAc.
L., 14 (Oct. 1, 2008) http://denning.1aw.ox.ac.uk/iecl/ocjsurvey.shtml (click the "Summary
of survey results" hyperlink) [hereinafter Oxford Study].
49. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
CORPORATE FINANCE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 94 (2007).
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fairness.5 0 The German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof or
BGH) is, inter alia, criticized for setting too high a standard for the
individual negotiation of contractual conditions,51 for transferring
certain clause prohibitions of the German Civil Code to business-to-
business commerce without proper reflection, and for failing to give
sufficient consideration to its usual customs. 52 In addition, the BGH
classifies bond conditions as standard contract terms, which are, at least
in principle, subject to judicial review pursuant to the provisions on
unfair contract terms of the German Civil Code, if the bond is subject to
German law.5 3 In both cases, foreign law obviously offers stronger
protection for formal private autonomy. Swiss law does not provide for a
general judicial review of standard terms in legal transactions between
companies, nor where consumers are involved. 54 According to English
law, bond conditions are not subject to judicial scrutiny of standard
terms either. Instead, they are considered part of the product of the
securities sold and, therefore, are not subject to review. 5
50. See Sebastian Brachert & Andreas Dietzel, Deutsche AGB - Rechtsprechung und
Flucht ins Schweizer Recht, ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DAS GESAMTE SCHULDRECHT [ZGS] 441, 441
(2005) (Ger.); Paul Hobeck, Flucht aus der deutschen Gerichtsbarkeit bei
wirtschaftsrechtlichen Streitigkeiten - warum?, DEUTSCHE RICHTERZEITUNG [DriZ] 177,
178 (2005) (Ger.); Kotz, supra note 13, at 3-4; Michael Abels, Gerichte zerstoren Vertrauen,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [FAZ] (Frankfurt), 19 (2007) (Ger.).
51. According to BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] Jan. 2, 2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT I [BGBL. U, § 305(1) (Ger.), freely negotiated contractual clauses are
not subject to judicial review with regard to the German provision on unfair contract
terms.
52. For more detail see Klaus Peter Berger, Abschied von der Privatautonomie im
unternehmerischen Geschaftsverkehr?, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTsCHAFTSRECHT [ZIP] 2149-
56 (2006) (Ger.); Karlheinz Lenkaitis & Stephan Lwisch, Zur Inhaltskontrolle von AGB
im unternehmerischen Geschaftsverkehr: Ein Plddoyer fur eine dogmatische Korrektur,
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR WIRTSCHAFISRECHT [ZIP] 441-49 (2009) (Ger.) (providing extensive
evidence from the case-law of the German Federal Supreme Court).
53. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGHJ [German Federal Court of Justice] June 28, 2005,
163 BGHZ [Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen] 311, 313-19 (Ger.)
(qualifying bond conditions as standard terms). For a detailed discussion of the problem,
see HORST EIDENMLLER, UNTERNEHMENSSANIERUNG ZWISCHEN MARKT UND GESETZ:
MECHANISMEN DER UNTERNEHMENSREORGANISATION UND KOOPERATIONSPFLICHTEN IM
REORGANISATIONSRECHT 214-23 (1999) (Ger.) (citing further references).
54. See Nathalie Voser & Christopher Boog, Die Wahl des Schweizer Rechts - was man
wissen sollte, 55 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 126, 133 (2009) (Ger.)
(containing further references).
55. See Lachlan Burn, Bond Issues Under U.K. Law: How the Proposed German
Legislation Compares, in DIE REFORM DES SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSRECHTS 219, 223-28
(Theodor Baums & Andreas Cahn eds., 2004) (Ger.). Certain mandatory provisions may
result from trust law and securities law. However, English law on consumer protection
concentrates less on mandatory substantive law and more on the regulation of the sellers
of bonds, see id. at 226-28.
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The Federal Government of Germany is thoroughly aware of the
declining importance of German law for bond issues of companies that
operate internationally. In an interview with then-Minister of Justice
Brigitte Zypries, published in May 2008, she said, "It is not that
German issuers no longer choose German law at all. But we have found
that many of them prefer foreign law."56 In the meantime, the German
Bond Act has been reformed with an effective date of August 5, 2009.57
The reform brought about substantial improvements, particularly for
the restructuring of bonds of distressed debtors. However, the judicial
review of bond conditions remained, at least in principle, unchanged.
C. Law of Dispute Resolution
The dominance of English and Swiss law continues in the field of
dispute resolution. For most of the companies questioned in the Oxford
study (17%), English courts are the preferred dispute resolution
forum.58 If the respective home jurisdiction is not chosen, Swiss courts
dominate (21%).59 The primary reasons given for preferring English and
Swiss forums for dispute resolution are the quality of the judges and
courts, as well as the United Kingdom having the "most favorable" civil
justice system in Europe (a response given by 26% of the companies
studied).60
Today, however, large commercial disputes are predominantly
resolved within arbitration proceedings (63% of the companies studied
prefer arbitration to court proceedings when conducting cross-border
transactions).61 There are many reasons for this.62 Arbitration
proceedings lead to a final decision in a relatively short time. The
parties can choose expert arbitrators. Most of all, the proceedings are
confidential and, therefore, less of a burden on the existing business
relationship.
56. Interview mit Brigitte Zypries: Schuldverschreibungsrecht "wird moderner",
BORSEN-ZEITUNG (Frankfurt), May 13, 2008, at 7.
57. SCHULDVERSCHREIBUNGSGESETZ [SCHVG] [ACT ON THE NEW REGULATION OF THE
LEGAL RELATIONS FOR DEBENTURES AND IMPROVED ENFORCEMENT OF INVESTORS' CLAIMS
RESULTING FROM WRONG ADVICE], July 31, 2009, BUNDESGESETZBLArr I [BGBL. I] 2512
(Ger.).
58. Oxford Study, supra note 48, at 26.
59. Id. at 27.
60. Id. at 35-36.
61. See id. at 45.
62. See Christian Biihring-Uhle et al., ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 63-67 (2d ed. 2006); KARL HEINZ SCHWAB & GERHARD WALTER,
SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT ch. 1 1 8 (7th ed. 2005) (Ger.).
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Arbitration proceedings are usually subject to the procedural
regulations at the place of arbitration,63 which can be chosen at will.64
In principle, according to the New York Convention,66 arbitral awards
must be recognized by all signatory countries. Just as the parties are
free to choose the place of arbitration and, therefore, the secondarily
applicable state procedural law, they can also regulate the proceedings
themselves, subject to certain mandatory principles, or refer to the
procedure rules of an arbitration institution.66
Systematic empirical investigations related to the popularity of
individual places of arbitration and procedural law and rules do not
exist to date. However, the published material on the number and
volume (i.e., amounts in dispute) of administrated arbitration
proceedings indicates that the most favored venues for arbitration in
Europe are Switzerland (e.g., Chambers of Commerce of Basle, Bern,
Geneva, Lausanne, Lugano, and Zurich), Paris (e.g., International
Chamber of Commerce), and London (e.g., London ICC International
Court of Arbitration).67 There appear to be a series of decisive reasons
for these preferences. The first reason is the subjectively perceived
neutrality of individual places of arbitration, which applies to
Switzerland in particular. The second reason is the historically
established professionalism associated with arbitration institutions
involved in these jurisdictions, along with their well-known and efficient
methods for administration of cases. Finally, ease in dealing with the
applicable substantive law is certainly also important. If, as happens
frequently, the parties declare Swiss or English law applicable as the
governing law of contract regarding dispute resolution, it is only natural
to call on an arbitration tribunal of experts in Switzerland or England.
63. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Dec. 5, 2005,
BUNDESGESETZBIATT I [BGBL. I] 3202, as amended, § 1025(1) (Ger.).
64. Id. § 1043(1).
65. U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted June 10, 1958), 330
U.N.T.S. 38, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/arbitration/
NYConvention.html.
66. ZPO § 1042(3).
67. As to the Chambers of Commerce of Basle, Bern, Geneva, Lausanne, Lugano, and
Zurich, see Arbitration Statistics 2008, SWiSS CHAMBERS' CT. ARB. & MEDIATION,
https://www.sccam.org/sa/download/statistics_- 2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
Statistics for the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris can be found at Facts and
Figures on ICC Arbitration: Statistical Reports, INT'L CHAMBER COM.,
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/arbitration/id5531/index.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2011). The
London Court of International Arbitration's website is available at http://www.lcia.org/
(last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
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D. Insolvency Law
Insolvency law is a fourth field providing useful insights into the
development of the law market in Europe. The European Insolvency
Regulation (EIR) ties international jurisdiction regarding principal
insolvency proceedings to the "centre of main interests" (COMI) of an
individual or a company. 68 If insolvency proceedings are commenced in
one jurisdiction, they are in principle subject to its procedural rules (i.e.,
to the lex fori).69
One of the main aims of the EIR is to prevent forum shopping.70 In
practice, however, this aim has not been fulfilled. On the contrary, the
COMI criterion is fact sensitive and susceptible to manipulation. This
applies in particular, but not exclusively, in situations concerning the
insolvency of a corporate group.71 In practice, forum shopping has
become an everyday legal reality when it comes to insolvency
proceedings. This is so in spite of a decision by the European Court of
Justice that sought to limit such strategic tactics. 72
For companies, England once again proves to be the preferred safe
haven. For example, prominent German enterprises such as
Schefenacker and Deutsche Nickel were transformed into English
companies and subsequently restructured in London.73 There are a
couple of reasons for businesses seeking a restructuring in England.74 In
English insolvency proceedings, creditors have greater control over the
course of the proceedings. In particular, they can appoint an insolvency
administrator, which is not possible under German law. English
insolvency proceedings are also considered swift, and they permit the
implementation of efficient restructuring techniques, such as debt-
equity swaps. This is not as easily done in Germany.75 Again, the
68. Council Regulation 1346/2000, EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, art. 3(1),
1990 O.J. (L 160) 1, 5 (EC).
69. Id. art. 4(1).
70. Id. recital (4).
71. See Horst Eidenmilller, Wettbewerb der Insolvenzrechte?, 35 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR
UNTERNEHMENS- UND GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [ZGR] 467, 474-79 (2006) (Ger.) (citing
further references).
72. See Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3813, 69(1)-(4).
73. See John Willcock, German Restructurings Head to London, INSOL WORLD, 4th Q.
2006, at 14, 14-15, available at http://www.insol.org/newinsolworld/2006/
4thQuarter2006.pdf.
74. See Horst Eidenmilller, Leveraged Buyouts und die Effizienz des deutschen
Restrukturierungsrechts, 2007 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZIP] 1729, 1733-37
(Ger).
75. See Horst Eidenmilller & Andreas Engert, Reformperspektiven einer Umwandlung
von Fremd- in Eigenkapital (Debt-Equity Swap) im Insolvenzplanverfahren, 2009
ZEITSCHRIFl FUR WIRTSCHAFISRECHT [ZIP] 541, 542-43 (Ger.).
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German legislature is well aware of the weaknesses of current German
company insolvency law. Thus, the Ministry of Justice has established
two expert commissions whose task is to prepare recommendations for
improving the status quo.76 Recently, plans for reforming the German
Insolvency Code (Insolvenzordnung) were released.77
While historically English law and England's place as a forum have
been of great importance to corporate restructurings, Germans have
recently begun to navigate their private insolvency matters to France.7 8
This has less to do with the perception of a generally better quality of
life in France, but rather with the different system of residual debt
discharge permitted in France. Discharge can be obtained under
German insolvency law as well, but only six years after the
commencement of insolvency proceedings.7 9 By contrast, in certain
ddpartements, French insolvency law offers discharge immediately after
insolvency proceedings.80 This, of course, provides a strong incentive to
establish jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings in France.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS AND EFFECTS OF THE LAW MARKET
Looking back at the description of individual segments of the
European law market, one notes certain characteristics and effects of
this market, which are important for its further analysis and resulting
policy recommendations. The development outlined above has
consequences for some of the central categories of the polity, such as
state, territory, and law.
76. The first of the two commissions deals with reform issues of company insolvency
law in general. The second commission deals with these insolvency issues in group
scenarios.
77. The text of these plans can be found in Diskussionsentwurf des BMJ fur ein Gesetz
zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen [Discussion Document of the
Federal Ministry of Justice on an Act for the Further Facilitation of the Reorganization of
Distressed Corporations], 2010 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFrSRECHT [ZIP] 1 (Supp. I),
which available at http://www.jura.uni-duesseldorf.de/dozenten/noack/Texte/InsO-
Reform%20DiskE.pdf (Ger.).
78. See Biarbel Nickles, Nach Frankreich des Konkurses wegen, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG [FAZI (Frankfurt), Jan. 29, 2008, at 11; Reinhold Riihl, Schulden-
Tourismus mit Hindernissen, SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG [SZ] (Munich), Jan. 13, 2008,
http://www.sueddeutsche.de/finanzen/925/429678/text/. The U.K. also has been quite
popular for German "insolvency refugees," see Uwe Pel, Fir Insolvenzflichtlinge in
England brechen hartere Zeiten an, INDAT-REP., no 1., 2010, at 30, 30-31 (Ger.).
79. Insolvenzordnung [InsO] (Insolvency Code), Oct. 5, 1994, BUNDESGESETZBLATT I
[BGBL. I] 2866, as amended, § 287(2) (Ger.).s
80. See Horst Eidenmiller, Abuse of Law in the Context of European Insolvency Law, 6
EuR. Co. & FIN. L. REv. 1, 19 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1353932.
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First, the equation between territorial sovereignty of a state and
applicable law is increasingly failing to add up. Laws of different
jurisdictions "apply" in a particular country, depending on the issues
and the groups of persons affected. At the same time, the power of a
country to pass binding legislation for activities within its territory is
waning, at least when choice opportunities are granted on a
supranational level. This disintegration of law and territory calls
traditional categorizations in comparative law more and more into
question.
Second, there is demand on the law market for law products that
satisfy the interests of those who are effectively in the position to
influence the choice of law. For instance, in company law, this applies to
shareholders and company managers, but not to employees and
creditors. In insolvency law, it relates to company managers,
shareholders, and large creditors, but not to small creditors. Finally, it
applies to the issuers of bonds, but not to their purchasers.
Third, the process of making law appears to be changing. Law is no
longer the result of political discourse, but instead the product of supply
and demand on international markets. Legal rules no longer appear to
be created in a debate about the "right" provisions. Instead, they are
apparently "made" by interest-related market forces.
Fourth, the example of arbitration shows that while the law market
involves competition between state rules, private rule-makers also
compete with one another to the extent that contracting parties can
choose their provisions. In arbitration, this is the case because the
procedural systems of private arbitration institutions can attain central
importance for the respective arbitration proceedings on the basis of
corresponding clauses in states' arbitration laws allowing such choice.
Finally, in the choice of legal rules, the popularity of Anglo-
American legal concepts can be clearly recognized. In many areas, these
concepts are characterized by their concentration on ex post liability,
contrary to the European tradition that instead often focuses on ex ante
control. This applies, for example, in the case of company law, in which
the European system of a fixed legal capital has come under
considerable competitive pressure. It also applies in contract law with
regard to the involvement of notaries, who are used as a precautionary
measure in the administration of justice prescribed in many legal
systems across continental Europe. Finally, the same is also true in the
field of dispute resolution. Whereas mediation is an unregulated
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profession in England, license restrictions and other hurdles are
currently the subject of intense debate in Germany.8'
V. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS MARKET ACTORS
What is the role of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the
transnational law market? An internationally acknowledged definition
of the term "transnational corporation" does not exist.82 Trying to fit all
traits of those corporations into one model definition would most likely
end up in arbitrary phrasing. Instead, the common characteristics of
TNCs should be assessed, and the term should be considered as a more
generic term that spotlights the most common peculiarities of those
businesses. For example, TNCs usually engage in cross-border
transactions and maintain subsidiaries, branches, assets, and other
significant resources in more than one jurisdiction.83 Their economic
relevance as market actors can be enormous, particularly for small and
mid-size countries.84 TNCs can be assumed to be fully rational market
actors, and they are repeat players.
With respect to the transnational law market, the specific cost-
benefit position of TNCs translates into superior choice incentives. As a
consequence of their presence in many countries, investment and asset
shifting are eased. Further, scale economies can be achieved by applying
one model set of terms and conditions, as far as the applicable state law
permits, to all contracts in a certain field of business activity worldwide.
Finally, engaging in bankruptcy forum shopping is relatively cheaper
for TNCs as compared to small or medium-size enterprises.
The superior choice incentives of TNCs create an enlarged set of
legal options. TNCs have a strong incentive to engage in "private
ordering" (i.e., to use contract rules as a flexible and efficient
81. For this discussion, see Horst Eidenmiiller & Matthias Prause, Die europdische
Mediationsrichtlinie: Perspektiven fdr eine gesetzliche Regelung der Mediation in
Deutschland, 2008 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr [NJW] 2737, 2742-43 (Ger.). See
also, Gesetz zur Forderung der Mediation und anderer Verfahren der auf8ergerichtlichen
Konfliktbeilegung, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ [FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE] (Aug.
4, 2010), available at http://www.werner-baurecht.delmedia/pdf/Foren/Baukonflikt
managementlRefEMediationsgesetz_20100803.pdf, for a draft statute on mediation.
82. See Katarina Weilert, Transnationale Unternehmen im rechtsfreien Raum? Geltung
und Reichweite volkerrechtlicher Standards, 69 Heidelberg J. Int'l L. 883, 886 (2009)
(Ger.).
83. See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 5-8 (2d ed.
2007).
84. The revenues of large TNCs can easily exceed the gross domestic product (GDP) of
even certain mid-size national economies. For examples, see Weilert, supra note 68, at
883-84 & n.1.
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mechanism in designing tailor-made governance regimes for their
dealings with business partners, such as suppliers or distributors). As
case studies show, powerful corporations often subject such partners to
codes of conduct (e.g., as to product quality and labor conditions) and
certain other for the corporations favorable contract provisions as a
precondition for doing business.85 In the absence of transnational
regulation in many fields, TNCs fill in the gaps by means of contract.
The contracting standardization brought about in international trade-
as described by the phrases lex mercatoria and new law merchant,
respectively-can partly be ascribed to the standard-setting power of
large TNCs.86 It appears that "private constitutions" spread and replace
statutory law, undermining its regulatory function and the values it
embodies.87 But this view would be too narrow. It neglects to consider
the fact that private ordering is always conditioned by enabling and
limiting legal rules and is thus embedded in a specific legal framework
(e.g., freedom of contract, enforcement of contracts, recognition of
arbitration, and others).
Finally, the excellent choice set of TNCs translates into superior
bargaining power. In this regard, the function of nonagreement
alternatives is of crucial importance. As is well known, bargaining
power is mainly derived from good nonagreement alternatives. 88 As a
consequence of their superior choice set and, hence, nonagreement
85. See Larry Cati Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Law Making: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739 passim
(2007) [hereinafter Backer, Global Private Law Making] (regarding Wal-Mart's forays into
private law making, including two case studies in Germany and Jordan); Larry CatA
Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of Transnational Regulation,
14 ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L. 499, 508-23 (2008) [hereinafter Backer, Multinational
Corporations] (using Gap Inc. as a case study); A. Emmerich-Fritsche, Transnationales
Recht 3 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.oer-alt.wiso.uni-
erlangen.de/TransnationalesRecht.pdf (ast visited Mar. 6, 2010) (Ger.). With respect to
"private ordering" in general, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
319, 319-20, 324-29 (2002).
86. See Emmerich-Fritsche, supra note 85, at 1-7.
87. For broader accounts on this, see Backer, Global Private Law Making, supra note
85, at 1748-49; Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 71, at 517-23; Gralf-Peter
Calliess & Hermann B. Hoffmann, Judicial Services for Global Commerce - Made in
Germany?, 10 GERMAN L.J. 115, 118-19 (2009); Giinther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of
Multinationals: Company Constitutions Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-
Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND:
PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL JURIDIFICATION 203, 208-10 (Rainer
Nickel ed., 2010); Giinther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of
"Private" and "Public" Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
(2011).
88. CHRISTIAN BIJHRING-UHLE, HORST EIDENMfJLLER & ANDREAS NELLE,
VERHANDLUNGSMANAGEMENT 26-30, 67-70 (2009) (Ger.).
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alternatives, TNCs can, all the more by concerted action, wield strong
influence on regulators and policy makers (e.g., with regard to WTO
negotiations or the enactment of investment treaties).8 9 Internationally
operating market actors can pressure national or local representatives
by threatening to exit the country in question.90 Fearing potential
welfare losses for the national economy, politics might be apt to give in
to demands with regard to the conclusion of (or consideration of certain
provisions in) investment protection agreements, double taxation
treaties, and the grant of subsidies, as well as others. This is, once
again, especially true for small and mid-sized countries. Taken together,
and regardless of how one coins this phenomenon, 91 this scenario entails
the danger of regulatory capture.
In sum, the cost-benefit position of TNCs translates into superior
choice incentives. TNCs can choose from an enlarged choice set that
comprises private regimes because they are equipped with excellent
nonagreement alternatives and, as a consequence, superior bargaining
power. Hence, TNCs have stronger incentives, greater opportunities,
and more power to engage in legal arbitrage within the transnational
law market than small and medium-sized enterprises.
VI. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE LAW MARKET
Normative assessment of the law market and regulatory
competition is of central importance for legal policy. This assessment
can be made from different perspectives. First, we can ask how law is
"produced" in a market environment and how this process is to be
evaluated. In addition to this process-oriented perspective, we can also
ask how the results and consequences of the law market are to be
assessed. This is a results-oriented perspective. Both viewpoints are
meaningful and form the basis for the following analysis.
89. See Backer, Multinational Corporations, supra note 71, at 505-08; Karsten Nowrot,
Transnational Corporations as Steering Subjects in International Economic Law: Two
Competing Visions of the Future? 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. _(Part. II.A-B) (2011);
see also Behrens, supra note 11, at 59.
90. See Meessen, supra note 27, at 705.
91. In public international law, the debate revolves around the issue of whether to
ascribe "functional statehood" to powerful transnational corporations. For details, see
Tillmann Rudolf Braun, Der Staat zieht sich zurick, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG
[FAZ] (Frankfurt), Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.faz.net/-00ml00; Weilert, supra note 68, at
909, 911-12.
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A. Process-Oriented Perspective
A purely process-oriented perspective makes objections to the law
market appear obvious. As already mentioned, we conceive law to be the
result of public debate and decisions of elected representatives. We
regard it as strange that law should instead be considered a product
"made" by the market. Such a scenario would appear to involve
corruption of the political process.
Upon closer inspection, however, this objection proves to be
unfounded. The law market is a function of legal rules allowing choice of
law. Simply put, the law market itself is the product of law. The legal
rules permitting these choice opportunities are deliberately set by
competent law-making bodies after a reflective process. This applies
equally to judge-made case law. Moreover, relevant legislation and
judicial decisions affecting choice of law can, at least in principle, be
altered. It is therefore possible to second-guess and withdraw previously
granted opportunities to choose. Even if a particular country cannot
influence the rules of the game or can only do so to a limited extent-in
the case of choice opportunities being granted at a supranational level,
for instance-it nevertheless, at least in principle, is free to deliberately
withstand competitive pressure and align legal policy according to other
factors. In other words, no country is forced to fix legal rules purely or
predominantly from the point of view of their success on the
transnational law market. The law market, therefore, leaves the
primacy of politics untouched.
B. Results-Oriented Perspective
Decisive questions hinge on whether a country should grant
opportunities for choice of law and whether it should succumb to
competitive pressure and act as a competitor in the law market. The
answers to these questions depend on the consequences of regulatory
competition and how these consequences are assessed. This suggests a
results-oriented perspective.
From a philosophical point of view, a results-oriented perspective
does not automatically imply a utilitarian perspective. If, in the Kantian
tradition, one assumes that there is good (right) law, independent of the
preferences of the persons subject to the law, then this is a non-
utilitarian perspective on the consequences of the law market. From
this perspective, law as a product is almost automatically fraught with
problems.
However, such a non-utilitarian view of the law market does not
mean that a utilitarian perspective would be wrong or unhelpful. The
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opposite is true. Considering normative questions of political
philosophy, the orientation towards the preferences of those who are
affected by certain legal rules obviously has great appeal. Yet, this
approach requires a utilitarian (or public welfare economic) assessment
of the law market and its consequences. 92 Such an assessment will be
attempted in the following section.
1. The Law Market as a Discovery Process
Many decades ago, this issue was at the center of an important
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning company law. In a
famous dissenting opinion, Justice Brandeis suggested, "Companies
were early formed to provide charters for corporations in states where
the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in
advertising their wares. The race was one not of diligence but of
laxity."93 Brandeis thought that regulatory competition in company law
would lead states to lower protective standards-for shareholders,
creditors, and others-in order to become or remain attractive. The
German Federal Supreme Court voiced similar concerns in its order to
refer a case to the European Court of Justice in the Uberseering
proceedings. The court stated, "It is to be feared that in a competition
between legal systems of this sort, precisely the legal system with the
weakest protection for third party interests will succeed ('race to the
bottom')."94 Both decisions deal exclusively with the market for company
law, but they refer to a general issue of paramount importance: the
question of whether the law market and regulatory competition actually
promote public welfare as a whole or whether they only benefit
individual participants at the expense of the public.
a. Theoretical Considerations
Something that generally holds for public welfare effects of markets
should also hold for the law market. Just as products and services
markets generally lead to an efficient equilibrium, provided that certain
conditions are fulfilled, the law market should produce such equilibrium
92. This does not fail to recognize that utilitarianism and public welfare economics, as
legislative theories, can of course be challenged. See HORsT EIDENMLLER, EFFIZIENZ AIS
RECHTSPRINZIP 173-234 (3d ed. 2005) (Ger.) (presenting utilitarianism and public welfare
economics as one, but not the only meaningful one, conceivable and helpful legislative
perspective on the law market).
93. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 558-59 (1933).
94. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 30, 2000,
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 903, 904, 2000 (Ger.).
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as well.95 Thus, regulatory competition between countries apparently
has the potential to initiate a discovery process for the best or most
efficient law.96 The basic argument is that countries will invent new law
products if they assume demand for them, and these law products will
establish themselves on the market if the demand is present. Other
countries will then imitate the innovative country. The historical
emergence and prevalence of the limited liability company in the United
States seems to confirm this assessment.97
At the same time, regulatory competition between countries can be
viewed as a tried and tested means to balance the influence of powerful
interest groups within individual jurisdictions. Regulatory competition
gives citizens the means to counteract public choice failures in the
legislative process in their own country; "bad law" is not chosen. This
aspect is important, especially with regard to so-called developing
countries. Jurisdictions that do not yet have reliable and transparent
rules cannot deny that the development of their country rests on
building a solid legal infrastructure. For example, consider the case of
dispute resolution: If a country's own judicial system is corrupt, the only
and frequent escape is to seek international arbitration.
Finally, regulatory competition involves different legislative units
(e.g., countries and jurisdictions) with competing local competences.
These local units are able to provide appropriate legislative
consideration to differences in local preferences. The fact that
regulatory competition is an instrument for limiting the influence of
interest groups at a local level does not mean that legislation that is
oriented towards local preferences cannot be beneficial. In other words,
regulatory competition has the potential for local law to establish itself
because it is efficient.98
95. For a detailed (and critical) discussion of the theoretical bases of regulatory
competition and the necessary conditions for equilibrium, see William W. Bratton &
Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary
Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201 (1997).
96. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to
Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J. 534, 550 (2006); cf.
Friedrich A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 179-90 (Friedrich A. Hayek ed., 1978).
97. For a brief description of the history of the limited liability company, see LLC
History, LIMITED LIABILITY Co. REP., http://www.lc-reporter.com/16.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2011) (citing further references).
98. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 95, at 213-16, 260-68.
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b. Empirical Findings
This is the theory. By contrast, empirical evidence as to the
beneficial effects of regulatory competition on public welfare is
comparatively scarce, often inconclusive, and relates primarily to a
specific market segment, namely company law. In this context, so-called
event studies from the 1980s revealed that shareholders of corporations
in the United States clearly see reincorporation in Delaware as a
positive sign because firms' stock market prices increased.99 In the case
of reincorporation as an SE, an investigation of the development of the
stock market price recently reached a similar result. Reincorporation as
an SE was considered a positive sign by shareholders as well.100 These
event studies show that regulatory competition in company law tends to
produce better law, which increases shareholder value. Other results in
line with these findings indicate that companies incorporated in
Delaware apparently have a higher company value (i.e., Tobin's q) than
other companies. 101
On the other hand, it is very difficult from a methodological point of
view to exclude self-selection effects in the cited studies. It might be the
case that it is not Delaware law that triggers an increase in stock
market prices or company value, but instead, that companies that are
more valuable in the first place, or plan a transaction that will increase
value, seek incorporation in Delaware for completely different reasons.
Moreover, the company law of Delaware also contains provisions that
make takeovers more difficult. Such provisions are generally considered
to be harmful to shareholders.1 02 In any case, Delaware's company law
does not appear to be as efficient as it could be, even if the cited
provisions do not go as far as those of other states in the United States.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that event studies of the type
previously cited only measure welfare effects with regard to
99. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 20 (1993)
(referencing a number of these studies).
100. See Horst Eidenmilller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf, How Does the Market
React to the Societas Europaea?, 11 EUR. Bus. ORG. L. REV. [E.B.O.R.] 35 (2010) (finding
positive, albeit not statistically significant, effects).
101. See Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. EcoN.
525, 525-58 (2001). But see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32 (2004) (finding that although Delaware corporations were worth
more than non-Delaware corporations from 1991-1996, they are not worth significantly
more after 1996).
102. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 404-09 (2003); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1800-06 (2002).
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shareholders. Such studies do not take into account the effects on other
stakeholders, such as creditors.
A similarly inconclusive picture emerges with respect to regulatory
competition in company insolvency law. Delaware had been the
preferred bankruptcy venue in the United States until the end of the
twentieth century, when New York took over. Firms reorganized in
Delaware show higher refiling rates than firms reorganized elsewhere
(which is bad),103 but Delaware proceedings are faster than other
proceedings (which is good).104 Hence, the available empirical evidence
with respect to the efficiency effects of bankruptcy forum shopping is
mixed.
On the whole, existing empirical studies on the results of regulatory
competition hardly serve as a basis for sound conclusions on its positive
or negative effects on societal welfare. However, as long as empirical
data does not point to clear market failure of regulatory competition in
certain market segments, the assumption that regulatory competition
produces positive effects as a discovery procedure in the market and for
society is a legal policy attitude worth defending. Legal reforms in
various jurisdictions specified above certainly offer sufficient evidence
that regulatory competition triggers a boost in innovation between
competing states. Consequently, problems will probably not lie in the
freedom to choose the applicable law and the resulting law market in
principle. Rather, they are likely to appear in special situations in which
a choice of law is problematic and should not be permitted, or at least
should be restricted. This involves cases in which unrestricted choice of
law would clearly have negative welfare effects. Some of these fact
patterns will be discussed below.
It should be noted at the outset that such negative welfare effects
will be examined with respect to the market for legal products and
regulatory competition in this market, not with respect to the market
for investments and regulatory competition in this field. As is well
known, competition for investments might compromise the provision of
certain public goods, as private actors do not have sufficient incentives
to pay for all public goods (e.g., human rights, environmental protection,
103. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company
Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York- Empirical Evidence of a 'Race to the Bottom", 54
VAND. L. REv. 231 (2001); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and
New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1933 (2002).
104. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Why Do Distressed Companies Choose
Delaware? An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Bankruptcy 15-17 (Univ. of Pa., Inst.
for Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 03-29, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=-463001; Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A
Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L.
REv. 283, 295-297 (2001).
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and labor standards).1o5 However, the market for legal products is a
function of the freedom to choose applicable law, irrespective of
particular investment decisions. Hence, the problems related to this
freedom and the associated market are special.
2. Freedom of Choice of Law and Third Party Interests
The first problematic scenario is found where free choice of law
would have disadvantageous effects on third parties who are not, or not
automatically, in a position to influence this choice and protect their
interests.106 Economists would say that these are cases in which choice
of law triggers negative external effects. Such effects lead to
inefficiencies if they cannot be corrected at low transaction cost by
negotiations in the markets.107
First, the type of third-party affected is important. To the extent
that a choice of applicable company law is involved, tort creditors are
unable to protect themselves. They are "involuntary creditors." The
same applies to so-called "nonadjusting creditors" (e.g., small claims
creditors and employees). 08 Their opportunities to protect themselves
are restricted for two reasons. First, it is usually not worth the time,
effort, and expenditure required of these creditors to obtain extensive
security against an increased credit risk. However, the primary reason
such creditors are restricted is because they are normally unable to
assert their interests in negotiations effectively due to their weak
negotiating position, which stems from their lack of good alternatives in
case of failure to reach agreement. 09 The situation is different with
regard to powerful contract creditors, such as banks. In light of these
considerations, law-making bodies are justified in providing mandatory
protection for tort and other nonadjusting creditors against the
consequences stemming from corporations' freedom to choose which
laws apply to their business dealings. 110
105. See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 83, at 463-506, 507-36, 537-74; Weilert, supra note 91,
at 915.
106. See Rilhl, supra note 7, at 178-80.
107. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 5-8 (1960).
108. The concept of non-adjusting creditors was introduced by Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105
YALE L.J. 857, 882-91 (1996).
109. For a discussion of the importance of non-agreement alternatives for one's own
negotiation position, see BOHRING-UHLE, EIDENMOLLER & NELLE, supra note 88.
110. In the European context, this is - to a certain extent - possible because the
freedom of establishment for companies (Articles 49, 54 TFEU) can, according to the case
law of the ECJ, be restricted on account of imperative public interest requirements. See
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A second major factor that may negatively impact third-party
interests is the timing of choice of law. This is particularly relevant with
regard to the freedom to choose applicable insolvency law. If a company
is formed, then, in keeping with the analysis, at least larger creditors
have some time to react to an altered risk situation associated with the
addition of new clauses. However, if the COMI of a company is shifted to
a new jurisdiction just prior to an insolvency petition being filed, this is
almost certainly an insufficient amount of time for a creditor to react.
The situation may be different if the shift of the COMI is steered by
certain major creditors. Ultimately, this means that mandatory
protective rules, at least in favor of nonadjusting creditors, may be
justified with respect to forum shopping immediately prior to business
insolvencies. The exception would be creditors who have been active in
promoting this forum shopping or who are otherwise responsible for
it.111
3. Freedom of Choice of Law and Rational Disinterest
Other problems with choice of law and the market for law products
arise when one partner is formally involved in the exercise of choice of
law, but actually makes no, or insufficient, use of the legal power
granted thereby. The problem of such "rational apathy" particularly
arises in connection with standard terms. The opponent of such clauses
bases his business decision on the price and quality of a product or
service, but not on the quality of the small print. It tends not to be
worthwhile for the opponent to study the relevant clauses and then link
his decision to enter into a contract to legal regulations, which may or
may not exist. In turn, this preference by the nondrafting party has an
effect on the conduct of the clause provider; "good quality" (i.e., clauses
that grant the opponents far-reaching rights) is not honored by the
market, which may result in a deterioration of average "term quality"
(i.e., adverse selection) and possibly even a collapse of the relevant
market.112
HORST EIDENMOLLER ET AL., AUSLANDISCHE KAPITALGESELLSCHAI'EN IM DEUTSCHEN
RECHT § 3 IT 20-72 (Horst Eidenmiiller ed., 2004) (Ger.) (citing further references).
111. The provisions of the European Insolvency Regulation on secondary and territorial
insolvency proceedings in the Member States in which the debtor maintains a branch can
be understood to be such mandatory protective provisions. Council Regulation 1346/2000,
arts. 3(2), 27-38, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 5, 9-11 (EC). The manipulation of the COMI is easier
than the manipulation of a "physically present" branch.
112. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (developing a path-breaking theory on the effects of
"good quality" products and services and "lemons" in the underdeveloped world).
736
THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW MARKET
This problem arises not only in connection with standard terms, but
also generally where one party to a contract, in contrast to others, has
no rational interest in negotiating certain clauses. In the context of
choice of law provisions, this applies particularly when consumers are
involved.1 13 A large company with worldwide sales of its products has
every incentive to identify the law most favorable to it, and to assert
that law into its contracts through choice of law provisions. In view of
the large number of contracts entered into, this investment is
worthwhile. For the consumer on the other side, however, the opposite
is true. Market forces-in particular, reputational effects--act as a
correction to the systematic exploitation of consumers by the choice of
legal systems in which their interests are not, or not sufficiently,
protected. However, this market correction has only limited effect if a
company is close to insolvency and has little to lose.
In the example of bond covenants discussed above, this can be the
basis for justifying why bond covenants that restrict creditors' rights
should be controlled and why such control should be possible. In
principle, this also applies to choice of law clauses contained in such
bond conditions. However, if one were to consider such clauses null and
void in cases where appropriate (i.e., vis-A-vis certain individuals or
institutions), the bond might then be subject to different legal systems.
This would destroy the uniform treatment of the issue. For this reason,
article 6(4)(d) of the Rome I Regulation 14 ultimately and rightly
provides that the freedom of parties to insert such choice of law clauses
should be upheld by the judiciary." 5
There is no substantive basis for courts to void choice of law clauses
where, for example, two companies subject a large-scale contract to
foreign law, such as Swiss law, following protracted negotiations. Where
the companies involved are highly sophisticated, it must be assumed
that all participants know what they are doing. The same applies to
substantive contractual conditions contained in such clauses. The case
law of the German Federal Supreme Court, which generally classifies
such clauses as standard terms and reviews them according to clause
review standards, is therefore rightly criticized.11 6
113. See Rhi, supra note 8, at 180-82.
114. Council Regulation 593/2008, on the Law Applicable to Contractual Relationships
Under the Law of Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 12 (EC).
115. For a detailed analysis, see Peter Mankowski, Finanzvertrage und das neue
Internationale Verbrauchervertragsrecht des Art. 6 Rom I-VO, RECHT DER
INTERNATIONALEN WIRTScHAFr [RIW] 98-118 (2009) (Ger.).
116. See supra Part III.B.
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4. Freedom of Choice of Law and Irrational Conduct
The two possible reasons discussed above, which promote
restrictions on the freedom of parties to insert choice of law provisions
in contracts, even when the contracting parties are acting rationally,
concern the economically inefficient results that are to be expected from
such behavior. Such inefficient results may be seen with regard to the
negative effects that such provisions have on third parties, or, where a
party to the contract has no interest in a choice of law provision or finds
it insufficiently valuable when weighed against the other benefits
associated with entering into the agreement.
In the last three decades, social science research has shown that
under certain circumstances, individuals act irrationally, not only
occasionally, but virtually systematically.117 This applies, for instance,
to people's optimistic yet unjustified assessments ("over-optimism"), to
their underestimation of future losses or profits ("hyperbolic
discounting"), to their overvaluation of things in their possession (when
compared to things which they do not have-"endowment effects").
Some of these phenomena are relevant in the context of regulatory
competition and the law market as well. Consider the following:
German founders of companies who see the direct advantages of an
English Ltd. (e.g., swift and cost-effective formation), but underestimate
the consequential costs associated with it (e.g., expert advice).
Nevertheless, it is sound policy not to take these considerations as
grounds for limiting the freedom of choice of law. First, these
considerations are not specific with regard to the choice of foreign law,
but rather generally relevant for the composition of substantive law on a
national level. If one considers a specific phenomenon of irrationality to
be empirically demonstrated-which may well be disputed-, the
appropriate policy reaction is a review of the general legal reaction by
the competent authority to this phenomenon. There is no reason to
restrict such review to parties' decisions about the choice of law.
Instead, a review of national substantive law would be appropriate.
Second, care should be taken when considering such legal reactions. The
appropriate legislative answer to systematic irrationalities is in no way
obvious. Should the private parties' freedom to make decisions be
limited as a whole? Or, should the legal system work towards rational
decisions ("debiasing through law"" 8 )? Does it perhaps even make sense
117. See, e.g., Horst Eidenmilller, Der homo oeconomicus und das Schuldrecht:
Herausforderungen durch Behavioral Law and Economics, JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 216,
218-19 (2005) (Ger.) (including further references).
118. See generally Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006) (discussing how "debiasing through law . . . could work to address
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to maintain counterfactually the assumption of rational behavior? If the
consequences of irrational behavior are bearable in an individual case-
as is usual where pecuniary loss is concerned-, then there is much to
be said in favor of this last-mentioned legislative strategy. It is not
advisable for a legal system dedicated to private autonomy to prevent or
protect every person entering into a contract from every mistake, even
mistakes that may have high costs to the contracting parties. This
reasoning also has an economically sensible and educational effect on
the public.
5. Freedom of Choice of Law and Unbundling
As touched upon earlier, expanded opportunities for freedom to
choose applicable law imply that an "unbundling" of issues becomes
easier. Market actors can be sector-specific in their choices (i.e., they are
not forced to accept or reject the laws of a particular country en bloc).
This kind of "cherry-picking" is bound to lead to inefficiencies where
legal institutions that complement each other are unbundled.1i 9
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical: a specific issue of
creditor protection, namely the ranking of shareholder loans in a
company's insolvency proceedings. Jurisdiction A subordinates such
claims in its company law, while Jurisdiction B subordinates such
claims in its company insolvency law. Let us assume that the company's
owners are based in A. They use a company law form from Jurisdiction
B for the business, and, upon financial failure, they put the company
into insolvency in A. It appears that they have the best of both worlds,
at least with respect to shareholder loans. However, restricting the
shareholders' choice is clearly warranted in such a scenario.120
6. Freedom of Choice of Law and Path Dependencies
Finally, due to path dependencies, the law market and the
associated competition between jurisdictions may not necessarily lead to
an efficient outcome. National laws are the emanation of social systems
legal questions across a range of areas, from consumer safety law to corporate law to
property law" and "steer people in more rational directions").
119. See Behrens, supra note 11, at 54-55; Klaus Heine & Wolfgang Kerber, European
Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence, 13 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 47,
60 (2002) (including further references); Wolfgang Schan, Playing Different Games?
Regulatory Competition in Tax and Company Law Compared, 42 C.M.L. REv. 331, 353-57,
359-60, 364 (2005).
120. EIDENMULLER ET AL., supra note 110, § 9 44.
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and legal traditions having developed over the time. 121 These
developments have created historically determinated lock-in effects. 122
To exemplify this, replacing a certain set of rules (e.g., the corporate
charter) by another can cause significant transaction costs triggered by,
inter alia, uncertainty as to the efficiency and effects of the new rules or
information costs with regard to external advice on the new regime.123
Also, the existing set of laws may be adjusted in accordance with other
rules of the same legal system (e.g., "complementaries"), and there may
exist dynamic scale economies associated with its use. This happens, for
example, when professionals are trained to apply and work with certain
rules. Hence, a switch to a new legal regime may not take place, even
though, in principle, the change in law would be more efficient. Due to
distinct differences among legal systems, path dependencies may be
more prominent in EU Member States than in the United States.124
However, it should be noted that path dependencies are not an
argument against allowing choice of law or against the associated
market for legal rules. Path dependencies indicate that the law market
and regulatory competition between jurisdictions is not going to lead to
the most efficient regime being adopted by all jurisdictions. In other
words, they point to the limits of the competitive pressure being exerted
by the market for legal rules. Curtailing options for choice is not a policy
conclusion that one should derive from this assessment.
In sum, the transnational law market has the potential to bring
about a discovery procedure for innovative and efficient legal products
in all of its segments. Problems may arise in some distinct situations
where allowing free choice of the applicable law cannot be assumed to
have such beneficial effects. Specifically, justification for curtailing the
law market may be seen if third parties are harmed by such choice, if at
least one of the choosing parties has no rational interest in the outcome
of the choice, or if the choice involves cherry-picking, which unbundles
complementaries in a particular legal system.
121. See Heine & Kerber, supra note 119, at 53-54, 63-64 (regarding German company
law); Zumbansen, supra note 96, at 534-535.
122. See Behrens, supra note 11, at 55-56; Heine & Kerber, supra note 119, at 53-60. See
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1999) (discussing how an economy's
initial corporate ownership structure can lead to inefficient path dependencies).
123. See Heine & Kerber, supra note 119, at 59-60 (including further references).
124. See Vahagn Movsesyan, Regulatory Competition Puzzle: The European Design 33
(Lab. of Econ. & Mgmt., LEM Papers Series No. 2006/30, 2006),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=985319.
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VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LAW MARKET
These considerations may serve as a basis for an answer to the
question as to how the law market should be regulated. As a starting
point, one must remember that the law market and, thus, regulatory
competition is a function of the law. The existing governance framework
is therefore important. It defines conditions under which regulatory
competition between individual countries emerges and establishes
selection constraints for successful and less successful law products. 125
The focus in the following segment of this article is the European legal
governance structure, which poses special and intriguing problems for a
federal legal system. However, the policy principles developed for this
system should, mutatis mutandis, also be helpful in designing
appropriate framework conditions elsewhere. Further, the question will
be asked whether a special regulatory regime is warranted vis-a-vis
transnational corporations.
A. The European Union
1. Guaranteeing Regulatory Competition
If one assumes that regulatory competition between the Member
States is welcomed because it leads to positive results for society (e.g.,
increased social welfare), the European Union should guarantee this
competition by legislation on opportunities for choice of law. These
opportunities should be granted at the supranational European level. It
is not sufficient for some or all individual Member States to adopt a
correspondingly liberal attitude. Each Member State could then decide
for itself to partly withdraw from regulatory competition by the
abolition of choice opportunities. For example, the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) rightly decided to ensure Europe-wide recognition of the
incorporation theory in international company law in its Centros case
law.
However, one may ask whether the fundamental framework
conditions of regulatory competition at the European level should not be
established by statutory law rather than by rules formed through case
law. An increase in legal certainty would be one of the main advantages.
For example, irrespective of the ECJ's welcome case law regarding the
recognition of foreign companies, a European regulation on
125. See Viktor J. Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, Institutional Competition Among
Jurisdictions: An Evolutionary Approach, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 193, 210-12 (1994)
(outlining "an evolutionary approach to the process of competition among institutions").
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international company law as a clear legal framework would be helpful.
An expert committee set up by the German government has made a
corresponding recommendation. 126
2. Limiting Regulatory Competition
Just as the European Union should guarantee regulatory
competition, it should also be careful to set necessary limits. Constraints
are justified where regulatory competition presumably leads to
inefficiencies. Appropriate limitations, as previously noted, should be
put into place: (1) to ensure the safeguard of third parties, (2) to
overcome inefficiencies associated with rationally apathetic parties, and
(3) to combat the unbundling problem. Intervention at the European
level should target the market failure in question.
At present, several EU directives on company law have already
addressed choice of law issues related to the protection of creditors.
Various other legislative projects should be pursued in this context. One
example is uniform provisions on management duties in a company
crisis that threatens the company's existence. 127 Such duties would work
toward protecting nonadjusting creditors in particular, and they could
not be avoided by strategic company law and bankruptcy forum choices.
Further, uniform rules on consumer protection make sense to
protect consumers from careless choices of law and counteract
information asymmetries. Freedom of choice of law should therefore be
recognized in principle (as is the starting-point of article 6(2) clause 1 of
the Rome I Regulation). However, the European Union should use
mandatory substantive rules to ensure that certain minimum protection
standards are maintained. Some mandatory rules, of course, exist
already, and new ones are currently being discussed. This applies in
particular to the consolidated Consumer Law Directive, a draft of which
has recently been proposed.128 Certainly, the more extensive such
126. See PROPOSAL OF THE DEUTSCHER RAT FOR INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT FOR
EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL COMPANY LAW
65-122 (Hans JUrgen Sonnenberger & Frank Bauer eds.,2007).
127. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, at 10-17, COM (2003) 284 (May 21, 2003),
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulLexUriServLexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2003:0284:FIN:EN:PDF. However,
following the revision of the Action Plan, this project is (unfortunately) not currently being
pursued any further.
128. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Directive of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Consumer Rights, COM (2008) 614 (Oct. 8,
2008), available at
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protective provisions are at the European level, the more difficult it is to
legitimize consumer protection in conflict of laws, at least where the
choice of law of another Member State is concerned.129
Regulatory intervention should not go further than necessary,
however.130 Tools that can be put to use are, inter alia, minimum
harmonization and a "menu approach."' 3 ' Under the latter approach,
Member States retain regulatory options, and private actors have a
menu of regimes from which to choose. A role model for such an
approach may be found in the optional arrangements provided for
Member States and companies by article 12 of the European Takeover
Directive. 132 However, self-regulation will often not be effective. The
recent financial crisis particularly provides ample evidence of how self-
regulation in the financial sector has failed dismally.133
3. Enriching Regulatory Competition
Finally, a third important task for the European Union is to enrich
regulatory competition by its own law products. Horizontal competition
between the Member States would then be complemented by vertical
competition between them and legal regulations of the European
Union.134 In certain areas, this has already taken place. The Societas
http://ec.europa.eulconsumers/rights/docs/COMMPDFCOM_2008_0614_F_ENPROPOS
ITIONDE DIRECTIVE.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2011).
129. Therefore, Article 6(2) Clause 2 in conjunction with Article 6(1) Rome I Regulation
must be critically assessed. According to this provision, the choice of law may not "have
the result of depriving the consumer of the protection afforded to him by provisions that
cannot be derogated from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of
choice, would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1 [law at the consumer's
place of habitual residence]." The mandatory protective law of the place of the habitual
residence therefore also applies if it is not based on harmonized European law. The
application of Article 9 (overriding mandatory provisions) or Article 21 (public policy of the
forum) to restrict a choice of law in relation to the Member States also presents problems.
Rome I, supra note 114, at 11-12.
130. See Behrens, supra note 11, at 58-59; Simon Deakin, Legal Diversity and
Regulatory Competition: Which Model for Europe?, 12 EUR. L. 440, 452 (2006).
131. See Karl M. Meessen, Economic Law as an Economic Good: Its Rule Function and
Its Tool Function in the Competition of Systems, in ECONOMIc LAw As AN EcoNoMic GOOD
3, 19 (Karl Meessen et al. eds., 2009) (regarding minimum harmonization); Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE
L.J. 2359, 2361-62 (1998) (regarding a "menu approach').
132. Council Directive 2004/25, Takeover Bids, 2005 O.J. (L 142) 12, 21 (EC).
133. See John C. Coffee, What Went Wrong? An Initial Inquiry into the Causes of the
2008 Financial Crisis, 9 J.C.L.S. 1 (2009), for more detail.
134. As to competition among rules at different levels, see Buxbaum, supra note 16, at
13-23. See also Stephen Woolcock, Competition Among Rules in the Single European
Market, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES
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Europaea (SE), for example, is a product of European law, at least in its
core structure, which competes with the Member States' law products
for public corporations. It is also likely that the EU will soon establish a
new corporate entity, the European Private Company (SPE), which
would then compete with national closed corporation entities found in
the different Member States. 135 The same is conceivable in the field of
private law. The development prompted by the Common Frame of
Reference may result in an optional European Code of Civil Law, which
parties may choose. 36
There is little to be said against the enrichment of horizontal
regulatory competition by vertical competition on the part of the
European Union. Of course, developing European law products costs
money. However, in many fields these costs have already been sunk. For
example, this is true in the case of the Societas Europaea (SE) and
European civil law. With regard to the latter, numerous research groups
were extensively supported over several years to prepare relevant model
regulations. 137 In addition, it is practically impossible to precisely
ascertain the benefits of European law products (i.e., uniform law or
uniform law products for various cross-border activities), which could
more than compensate for the costs incurred. In any case, the evidence
on likely cost-benefit effects does not suggest that it would be
irresponsible to pursue the project of vertical regulatory competition.
If and to the extent to which, the European Union decides to develop
its own law products, these should reflect "best market standards" and
be a benchmark for the Member States, instead of containing
particularly creative and innovative solutions. It is difficult to reach a
consensus at the European level about the structure of certain law
products. It is equally difficult to review a consensus that has been
reached. At the national level of Member States, both are easier. This
argues in favor of Member States primarily carrying out and developing
creative solutions. The European level is where established market
ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 287-321 (William Bratton
et al. eds., 1996).
135. See supra Part III.A.2.
136. See European Commission, Green Paper on Policy Options for Progress Towards a
European Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses, COM (2010) 348 (July 1, 2010),
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0348:FIN:en:PDF; see also
CHRISTIAN VON BAR ET AL., PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW: DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 80 (outline ed. 2009). As to
the DCFR in general, see Horst Eidenmuiller et al., The Common Frame of Reference for
European Private Law: Policy Choices and Codification Problems, 28 OXFORD J. LEG.
STUD. 659-708 (2008).
137. See Eidenmilller et al., supra note 136, at 665.
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standards should be reflected (i.e., in the sense of presumptively
efficient solutions).
B. Member States
If and to the extent to which the European Union enables and
guarantees regulatory competition in different areas, the Member
States should make their own law more competitive in these fields.
Their primary task is to develop law products that suit their users'
interests and are more likely to be selected. At the same time, Member
States can ease competitive pressure against their own laws by making
their legal rules optional as opposed to mandatory. As previously noted,
responsibility for imposing sensible restrictions on regulatory
competition lies primarily with the European Union, not the Member
States.
Even if the European Union leaves such competence and
responsibility to the Member States, 38 the latter should restrict
regulatory competition only if the negative effects of an unrestricted
choice of law in a specific situation are obvious. Such obvious negative
effects may be found especially vis-A-vis non-Member States. If and to
the extent the European Union does not pass any binding provisions in
this context, the Member States must decide whether they wish to
permit choice of law and open regulatory competition. To permit choice
of law presupposes a certain confidence in the protection of third parties
or parties with little business experience by those countries whose law
may be declared applicable. If this confidence does not exist or cannot be
created, restrictions on choice of law opportunities may be justified.
C. A Special Regulatory Regime for Transnational Corporations?
Considering the peculiarities of TNCs as powerful actors in the
transnational market for legal rules, special consideration should be
given to the question of whether these peculiarities require special
regulatory tools or distinct legal doctrines to deal with the challenges
posed. On its face, the superior choice incentives for TNCs, their
enlarged choice set, and their superior bargaining power seem to justify
some special regulatory regime.
However, the currently discussed proposals for such a special
regime go in very different directions. One suggestion is to subject TNCs
138. The legislative competence of the Union to set conflict of laws rules is beyond
doubt. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
arts. 81(1), (2)(c) 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 78.
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to public international law.139 Proponents of this suggestion argue that
partial public international legal status should be conferred upon TNCs.
They point to recent trends according to which multinational
enterprises have been assigned rights under investment protection
agreements. Sometimes TNCs even enter into such agreements directly
with the host country. 140 Another proposal is for the development, of
distinct, new private law doctrines, specifically designed for TNCs. For
example, such doctrines aim at treating TNCs as one single legal unit
for liability purposes; concepts such as "network responsibility,"
"connected contracts," and the "enterprise entity theory" fall into this
category.141 Another proposal goes so far as to suggest that TNCs should
be resocialized and brought again under state ownership on a
significant scale to do away with the problems they create in the private
law sphere. 142
Surely, the last suggestion is neither appropriate as a regulatory
approach in a market economy framework, nor would it be practical as a
general policy. However, the other proposed policy suggestions are also
problematic. Subjecting TNCs to public international law would create
delicate line-drawing problems. As already discussed, the term
"transnational corporation" is elusive in nature. Therefore, legal rules
ought not to be tied to the term itself. It seems almost impossible to
provide a legal definition of TNCs that is both precise and "justified" in
the sense of being neither over- nor underinclusive with respect to the
application of certain public international legal rules. Further, it is far
from clear why the existing regulatory instruments of national,
supranational, and federal laws, such as antitrust, and mandatory
contract rules, should not be sufficient or even more appropriate to
regulate private, albeit powerful, actors like TNCs.
139. See, e.g., Karsten Nowrot, Reconceptualising International Legal Personality of
Influential Non-State Actors: Towards a Rebuttable Presumption of Normative
Responsibilities, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY 369 (Fleur E. Johns ed., 2010).
140. See Nowrot, supra note 89, [Part III.A]. See also supra note 75 and accompanying
text.
141. For an overview, see Backer, Global Private Law Making, supra note 85, at 1744-
45. See also MUCHLINSKI, supra note 83, at 322-35 (regarding group liability); Ginther
Teubner, Coincidentia Oppositorum: Hybrid Networks Beyond Contract and Organization,
in CONTRACTUAL NETWORKS: LEGAL ISSUES OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION 3-30 (Marc
Amstutz & Giinther Teubner eds., 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=876939
(regarding hybrid networks and connected contracts). More generally as to the concept of
"connected contracts," see G. Mitu Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV.
887 (2000).
142. See Peter T. Muchlinski, The Changing Face of Transnational Business
Governance: Private Corporate Law Liability and Accountability of Transnational Groups
in a Post-Financial Crisis World Part III, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (2011).
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Similar problems beset the suggestion to develop specific private
law doctrines designed only or at least primarily for TNCs. With respect
to concepts that aim at treating TNCs as one single legal entity, it
should be noted that the economic benefits of keeping separate legal
entities separate should not be sacrificed too quickly. The proposed
concepts also, thus far, lack precision. Hence, the focus should be on
transnational regulation rather than on transnational liability under
private law. Pertinent approaches to subject matters that can only be
tackled sensibly at an international level are, to name just a few, the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the U.N. Global
Compact initiative.143 Common characteristics of these guidelines and
initiatives are the principle of voluntary submission and their public
sector origin. If voluntary submission is not deemed to be an
appropriate tool, a set of harmonized rules should be carved out at the
international level that, in a second step, are then to be translated into
standards recognized and enacted by the national legislatures (e.g., G-
20 or the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision).
In sum, "traditional" regulatory instruments and the existing
governance framework of national, supranational, and federal laws
provide appropriate regulatory tools for TNCs. A special regulatory
regime for TNCs is not warranted.
VIII. SUMMARY
Over the years, a transnational law market has emerged. Law has
become a product-in many parts of the world and in relation to
numerous different subjects. Individuals and companies seek attractive
legal rules, and countries compete for customers of their legal wares.
Transnational corporations are important actors in the markets for
investments and legal products. Nevertheless, they are not the only
active market participants. Small and medium-sized enterprises and
individuals compete for legal products as well. The main conclusions of
this article can be summarized as follows:
1. The development of the law market is based upon fundamental
changes in the framework conditions on the demand side, as well as on
the supply side for legal rules. On the demand side, it is, above all, the
expanded opportunities for choice of law in the conflict of laws
regulations enacted in many countries. This expansion of choice of law
opportunities has greatly increased the options for legal arbitrage. In
143. For more information, see http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ and
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355, en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1 ,00.html, respectively
(last visited Aug. 3, 2010). See also Weilert, supra note 68, at 913-14.
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addition, technological developments have facilitated swift and informed
choices of law. On the supply side, countries do compete for investments
(as they have done for a long time), but an increasing number of them
have also started to actively market their law products and to facilitate
the choice by private actors. In particular, this is attributable to the
economic advantages arising for countries if their law is successful in
international markets.
2. Regulatory competitions and the marketing of law products
have developed into a universal phenomenon. For Europe, as for the
United States, examples of this can be found in company law, contract
law, the law of dispute resolution, and insolvency law. In all of these
market segments, Anglo-American legal concepts are particularly
popular and gradually displace those of continental Europe. German
law is often regarded as inflexible and unfriendly to entrepreneurs.
3. The law market brings fundamental changes to basic categories
of the polity. The equation between territorial sovereignty of a state and
applicable law increasingly fails to add up. The power of a country to
pass binding legislation for acts in its territory at least decreases if
choice opportunities are granted at a supranational level.
4. The law market does not threaten the political process. Instead,
the origin and expansion of the law market may be seen as a
consequence of legal rules that were deliberately enacted following
public debate. The law market is a product of law. The primacy of
politics is preserved.
5. Regulatory competition between the legal products of different
states and the law market are, in principle, to be assessed positively and
used as a process to discover which law is best. Hence, regulatory
competition is tenable as a policy choice. Existing empirical findings do
not indicate systematic market failure, which would automatically lead
to a skeptical view of the law market.
6. However, constraints on regulatory competition are justified
where they presumably leads to inefficiencies. Free choice of law in a
law market is problematic if the interests of uninvolved third parties
are negatively affected. Choice of law provisions also lead to
inefficiencies where one participant formally enjoys free choice, but
actually has no interest in its exercise and is thus rationally apathetic
in relation to the choice. Further, cherry-picking by market actors and
an unbundling of complementary legal rules should be counteracted. In
all these cases, the law must restrict opportunities for a choice of law by
suitable framework conditions and ought to target the market failure in
question. Intervention should not go further than necessary, preserving
leeway for parties and law-making bodies to experiment and choose.
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7. In accordance with the fundamentally positive assessment of
regulatory competition and the law market, the European Union should
not only permit regulatory competition between Member States, but in
principle also guarantee it. The European Union should, however, set
binding limits for regulatory competition where it has negative effects
and where individual participants make unconsidered, or practically no,
decisions as to the choice of legal rules. Finally, there is nothing to be
said against the vertical enrichment of horizontal regulatory
competition between Member States by the European Union's own law
products.
8. Member States should make their legal regimes more
competitive where they are subject to regulatory competition at an
international level and develop better law products (i.e., make them
more efficient). They should restrict opportunities for choice of law-
presupposing they have the necessary legal competence to do so at all-
only if the detrimental effects of a choice of law are obvious in an
individual case.
9. TNCs are special, but they are not so distinct that they warrant
their own, peculiar regulatory regime. Traditional regulatory
instruments and the existing governance framework are also suitable
for transnational corporations.
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